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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFINING AND MINING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
- vs PAUL D. NIELSEN and the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Defemten:ta.

MARR, WILKINS &: CANNON
RICHARD H. NEBEKER
400 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MOTION TO GRANT REHEARING
Come now Paul D. Nielson and the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Defendants, and the Utah AFLCIO, a labor federation, amicus curiae, and petition
this court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled
matter, upon the grounds that this court erred as a
matter of law, in reversing the award of the Industrial Commission:
1. In failing to give proper interpretation and application to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65
(1966);
2. In failing to give proper interpretation and application to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65
(1966);
3. In failing to give proper interpretation and application to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67
(1966);.
4. In failing to give proper interpretation and application to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-79
(1966);
5. In holding that defendant Nielson established
both date of injury and the date of disability as
the same, and in basing this decision in part on
a matter of such minor import.

WHEREFORE, these parties respectfully move
this court to grant this motion for rehearing and permit further oral arguments and enter its order and
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decision affirming the award of the Industrial Commission below.
,,.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
PHIL L. HANSEN
... ·., . , ·.

.~,

· ; Attorneys.-General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
Industrial Commission
of Utah
A. W. SANDACK
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
UTAH STATE AFL-CIO
. 606 El Paso Natural Gas
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are as stated in
with the following additions:

th~

court's opinion

It does not appear in the court's decision that
Nielson, following his injury of September 16, 1952,
did in fact file a tim~ly application ~ith the Industrial Commission ·of Utah. This original claim, filed
with the Comm.ission on the 20th day of June, 1953,
gave the commission full, plenary'
continuing
jurisdiction of his claim (R-5).

and
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On July 13, 1966, {R-91) the Commission ordered
the employer to pay Nielson two awards:
1. Permanent partial compensation. for a 10%
functional loss to the right arm, and a 12% functional
loss to the left arm, amounting to $30.25 per week
for 24 weeksi a total of $7?,4.00.

2. Temporary total compensation from April
12, 1965, to and including December 1, 1965, at $30.25
per week for a.total of $1,01] .21.
The panel held the arm disabilities were directly
related to. the surgical knee procedure {R-91), and
the award was in addition to the 30% previously
paid Nielson for the permanent partial loss to his
lower left extremeties.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN MISAPPLYING AND MISINTERPRETING UTAH CODE ANN.§ 35-1-66 (1966).

·A careful reading of the partial disability statute
demonstrates that the legislature was actually creating two remedies for partially disabled workers.
The first, provides for compensation for injuries
to earning power. The first three paragraphs of this
section, Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-66 (1966), provides:
"Where the injury causes partial disability for
work, the employee shall receive, during such disability and for a period of not to exceed six years
from the date of the injury, a weekly compensation
equal to sixty per cent of the difference between his
average weekly wages before the accident and the
weekly wages he is able to earn thereafter, but not
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more than $42 per week, and in addition thereto
$3.60 for a dependent wife and $3.60 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years,
up to and including four, or a maximum of $60 per
week in the case of a dependent wife and four or
more such dependent minor children. (Emphasis
added.)
In case the partial disability begins after a
period of total disability, the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of
compensation.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured
person."

The compensation for this facet of the statuts
is limited to a period of "six years from the date of
injury" (See discussion infra).
Following the first three paragraphs, the legislature next carefully provided a schedule of compensation awards for partially disabling functional
body loss, not earning power:
One
One
One
One
One

arm at or near shoulder -------------·------ 200
arm at elbow___ _________________________ _ 180
arm between the writ and the elbow 160
hand ----··-----------·-----·--___________________ _ 150
thumb and the metacarpal bone
thereof __ ·----··-·--·____________________________ _ 60
One thumb at the proximal joint ________ _ 30
One thumb at the sP-cond distal joint __ _ 20
One first finger and the- metacarpal
bone thereof --~ _, _______________________ _ 30
One first finger at the proximal joint ___ _ 20
One first finger at the second joint _____ _ 15
One first finger at the distal joint __
10
One second finp;er and the metacarpal
bone thereof _____ ·-···--__ ,___ ··-·--·----- ·30

weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

6
second finger at the proximal joint 15
second finger at the second joint ___ _ 10
second finger at the distal joint . ___ _ 5
third finger and the metacarpal
bone thereof _______________________ .... _______ 20
One third finger at the proximal joint __ 12
One third finger at the second joint ______ _ 8
One third finger at the distal joint _______ _ 4
One fourth finger anrl metacarpal
bone thereof ___ __ _____________________ _ 12
9
One fourth finger at the proximal joint
One fourth finger at the second joint __ _
6
One fourth finger at the distal joint ___ _ 3
One leg at or near the hip joint as to preclude the use of an artificial limb ____ 180
One leg at or above the knee where stump
remains sufficient to permit the use of
an artificial limb _________ . _______________ 150
One leg between the knee and ankle ____ 140
One foot at the ankle _____________________________ 125
One great toe with the metatarsal
bone thereof _____________________________ _ 30
One great toe at the proximal joint _______ _ 15
One great toe at the second joint _______ _ 10
One toe other than the great toe with the
metatarsal bone thereof _____ __ _____ _____ 12
One toe other than the great toe at the
proximal joint _________________________________ _ 6
One toe other than the great toe at the
distal joint __________________________________ _
:i
In the above cases permanent and
complete loss of use shall be deemed
equivalent to loss of the member or
part thereof.
One eye by enucleation _______________________ 120
Total blindness of one eye _________________ 120
One
One
One
One

weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

weeks
weeks

It is clear from these paragraphs of the section
that compensation for these functional losses not to
exceed in any case 200 weeks, was subject only to
the limitation as to the maximum weekly amount
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payable in the section, or in no event to exceed $12,000.00.
This remedy is not conditioned upon any limitation of time. from the date of injury, so long as the
applicant has filed a timely claim under the general
statute of limitation; to-wit, three years.
Nielson was awarded $724.00 permanent partial disability compensation under this remedy, for
functional loss to the body, not for any partial loss
to his earning power.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
MISAPPLYING AND MISINTERPRETING UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-65 (1966).

Nielson also received a temporary total disability award of $1,011.21 lost weekly compensation
from April 12, 1965, to and including December 1,
1965 at $30.25 per week.
It will be argued that this position of the award
is limited by the six year provision contained in Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-65 (1953). We respectfully submit
that review of the history of workmen's compensation legislation will demonstrate that such argument
is untenable.
Utah Code Ann.

§

35-1-64 (1966) provides:

"No compensation shall be allowed for the first
three days after the injury is received ... provided,
however, if the period of total temporary disability
lasts more than 21 days, compensation shall also
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be payable for the first three days after the injury
is received."

This waiting period applies to all sections of the
workmen's compensation act.
In 1917, Revised Statutes of Utah

§

3136 read:

"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 10
days after the injury is received ... "

This was amended in Revised Stat.
(1933):

§

42-1-60

"No compensation shall be allowed for the first
three days after the injury is received ... "

This provision is a limitation on all compensation
awards. Although Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-64 applies
to all compensation, the temporary total disability
statute (35-1-65) has never expressly incorporated
this limitation. In order to interpret the temporary
total disability statute, it will be necessary to interpret the partial disability (35-1-66) statute.
Section 3138 of the Revised Statutes of Utah
(1917) provided:
"In no case shall compensation continue for more
than six years beginning on the 11th day of disability ... "

The comparable 1933 section reads:
"In no case shall compensation continue for more
than six years beginning on the 4th day of disability . . ."
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Finally, Laws of Utah 1939 Ch. 51

1 provided:

" ... six years from the date of injury ... "

This language has been retained in present law,
Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-66 (1966).
By reducing the waiting period from the 11th
day of disability. to the 4th day of disability, to the
date of injury, the legislature actually intended dat'3
of injury to mean the 1st day of disability.
This interpretation is supported by long precedent in the court. In Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937), this
court held:
"Not until there is an accident and injury and a
disability or loss from the injury does the duty to pay
arise. A mere accident does not impose the duty to
pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does not impose the duty. But accident plus injury which results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to
pay. When the employer refuses or ceases to pay
compensation, the cause of action against him
arises."

In Wiliams v. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah
376, 81 P.2d 649 (1937), the court held:
"In our recent decision in the case of Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission, 74 P.2d 657, we held,
overruling the previous cases, that the limitation
period does not be;:;in to run until a disability has
arisen resulting from accidental injury in the course
of employment. We there held that the limitation
statute in industrial accident cases (page 658),
* * * begins to run, not from the time of the
accident, but from the time of the employer's failure
to pay compensation for disability when the dis-

10
ability can be ascertain~d and the duty to pay compensation arises. * * *"

In State Industrial Fund v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 279, 209 P.2d 558 (1949), the court held
in an occupational disease case:
"This question is one of first impression in this
court under this statute, hut in Salt Lake City v.
Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657,
we passed on a somewhat similar question. There
we were dealing with the general statute of limitations as applied to the filing of a claim for workmen's
compensation. In that case the applicant in the
course of his employment by Salt Lake City was, on
,June 26, 1928, struck in his eye by a golf baJI and
thereby disabled for a short period of time for which
he was paid compensation without filing a claim
therefore. In January, 1936, this eye began to give
him trouble again, and later his doctors advised him
that he was P-·oing to lose the sight in his eye as the
result of the injury thereto in 1929 and on May 13,
1936, he filed his claim for compensation for such
loss. In holdinq that the claim was filed in time we
said on pa!!es 512-514 of 93 Utah Reports on page
658 of 74 P.2d;

* * * We think Section 104-2-26 R.S. Utah
1933, * * * was applicable as a statute of limitations,
but that it begins to run, not from the time of the
accident, but from the time of the employer's failure
to pay compensation for disability when the disability can be ascertained and the duty to pay compensation arises. * * * The Compensation Act
* * * imposes a duty on employers to pay compensation to employees who suffer disability from an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
the employment. Not until there is an accident and
injury and disability or loss from the injury does the
duty to pay arise. A mere accident does not imnose
the duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does
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not impose the duty. But accident plus in.jury which
results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to
pay. When the employer refuses or ceases to pay
compensation, the cause of action against him
arises."

And Justice Wolf concurring in the result wrote:
"It appears to me that in this sort of case the
reasoning in the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657, is applicable.
The employer's liability is imposed by statute; the
carrier's liability by contract made pursuant to the
statute for the benefit of any person disabled under
the terms of the statute. It follows, therefore, that
the conditions antecedent to the accrua of a cause of
action are; ( 1) A compensable disability under the
terms of the statute. (2) Reasonable diligence in
the ascertainment of the extent and nature of the
disability and the fact that it was employment
caused. (3) Knowledge of such compensable disability brought home to the responsible employer
which is notice to the carrier. ( 4) Refusal or failure
of the responsible employer (viz. his insurance carrier) to meet the obligation to pay compensation
within a reasonable time. The cause of action that
is the cause for the action against the carrier is under
the act, the failure or refusal of the responsible carrier to meet its contractual obligation which does
not arise until all three of the previous conditions
are or can be fulfilled."

It has also been held that injury means compensable injury or disabling injury and is synonomous with compensable disability. Hoschek v. Volcan Iron Co., 157 Pa. Super. 227, 32 A.2d 280 (1945).
See Mollerup Van Lines v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 235, 298, P.2d 882 (1965); and Spen-
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cer v. Industrial Commission. 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P.2d
692 (1955).
We respectfully submit that the phrase date of
injury means first day of disability. according to
"casualty," not calendar years, as held in Hardy v.
Industrial Commission. 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936)
and Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission,
116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949).
In Hardy this court held:
"The limitation provided by the section (permanent
partial disability relates to the disability period and
not the calendar period dating from the injury."

Therefore, a claimant could receive a maximum
of 312 weeks of disability payments within 6 casualty years.
When Hardy was decided, the partial disability
section provided for compensation not to exceed
six years from the 4th day of disability. If we equate
"date of injury" with first day of disability," then
Hardy remains pertinent.
After the 1939 amendment to the partial disability section, Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial
Commission came before the court. That case properly held the commission retained jurisdiction.
Where injuries were sustained in 1931 and aggravation resulted in 1948, the court observed in
Apex:
"Inasmuch as this is the only provision in either
statute with which we are here concerned, the reas-
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oning of this court in that case is applicable here.
We there held that the provision the.t payment of
compensation should not continue for more than six
years from the date of the injury was only meant
to fix the period during which payment is to extend,
that is, the disability period, and that it was not in
conflict with 42-1-72, supra, which provides that the
jurisdiction of the Commission shall be continuing.
We there said:
"We discover no conflict betwen section 42-1-62
and section 42-1-72, supra. The latter section is one
relating to jurisdiction only. The former relates to
the amount to be paid and the period during which
the payment shall extend. 'Where the injury causes
partial disability for work, the employee shall receive during such disability and for a period of not
to exceed six years' the compensation provided for
by the statute. Reading the whole section, it is apparent the part under consideration and last above
quoted has the same effect and meaning as though
it read: 'When the injury causes partial disability
for work the employee shall receive, during such disability * * * not to exceed six years, the compensation specified'.
"The limitation provided by the section relates
to the disability period and not the calendar period
dating from the injury.
We conclude that the Commission properly permitted a hearing and was empowered to make an
additional award of compensation should it be made
to appear that such an award was proper."

The court observed in Apex, that section 42-1-6 i
and 62 R.S.U. 1933 (35-1-65 and 35-1-66):
" ... are, in substance, identical when we limit our
consideration to the provision that payment of compensation shall not continue for more than six
years from the date of injury."
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Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that both
Hardy and Utah Apex Mining are controlling, unless
by this Nielson decision, the court overrules thes·3
pecedents.
POINT III
THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S C01\1PENSATION LAW IS DEFINITE
AND CERTAIN UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-67
( 1966).

The court's concern that:
"The three and six year statutes are ones of repose,
which we think the legislature intended should terminate, not encourage protraction of claims, otlierwise, an employer could and would be an insurer for
the natUral lives of its employees, based on real or
imaginary discoveries of erstwhile latent injuries .... "

is relieved by the last paragraph of Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-67 (1966), which clea.rly provides that:
"In no case shall the employer be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities
of any kind including loss of function, in excess of
$18,720."

Once this figure is reached, any combination
of disabilities such· as temporary total. temporary
partial. permanent partial, or permanent total are
subject to this overall monetary limitation.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER -OF LAW IN
MISAPPLYING AND MISiNTERPRETING UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-78 (1966).

The statute of limitation applicable to all workmen's compensation fow is provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-99 Cl 966).

It has been held in Spencer v. Industrial Commission, supra p. 645:
"In view of the express term of this statute of limi- _
tation, there can be no doubt that once the application has been filed, and the commission's jurisdiction invoked it has the authority to entertain
further proceedings to deal with any substantial
changes or unexpected developments that may arise
as a result of the injury.

There was no error committed, in fact, the
commission was obliged to take jurisdiction and
consider the new application."

Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-78 provides:
. "The power and jurisdiction of commission over
each case shall be continuing, and it may from time
to time make such modification or change with respect to former finding, or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified ... "

If, as the court holds in Nielson, the jurisdiction is continuing only for six years subsequent to
the date of injury, then there would be no reason
for the provision:
" ... that records pertaining to cases, other than
those of total permanent disability, or where a claim
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has been filed as .in 35-1~99, which has been closed
and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. (Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-78)."

The legislature obviously contemplated that aggravated disability should be compensated, even
though it occurred more than six years after the injury, provided proper appliation was made, and
findings supported the modification. See exhaustive
review of Utah cases in 165 A.LR. at 108 and 116,
and see the excellent article in Vol. 33-34 University
of Missouri, Kansas City Law Review, P.125 (1965).
A petition for modification is not a new proceeding. It is merely another step in the proceeding
which was initiated by the original application for
a claim. Parker v. Industrial Commission. 66 Utah
256, 241 Pac. 362 (1925); Utah Apex Mining Co. v. In·
dustrial Commission. 77 Utah 542, 298 Pac. 381 (1931).
Furthermore, where statutes provide review at
"any time," or from "time to time," review is not
barred at a later time by the expiration of the time
period for which compensation was originally
awarded and paid. Moray v. Industrial Commission.
58 Utah 404, 199 Pac. 1023 (1921); Utah Apex Mining
Co., supra.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erroneously construed Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1966) as
a limitation on the commission's continuing jurisdiction.
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POINT V ·
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THE LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT EXHAUSTS A CLAIMANT'S PERIOD OF COMPENSATION
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1966).

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-79 authorizes the commissio to commute periodical benefits into one lump
sum payment. It was stated in Barber Asphalt Corp.
v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 371, 135 P.2d
266 (1943):
"That provision does not purport to authorize the
commission to approve a lump sum settlement so
as to bar a claim for additional compensation for a
disability out of the injury which was not known, or
existing at the time of the payment. It connotes a
lump sum payment in lieu of installment payments
then awarded or owing under the statute for a disability then known. (135 P.2d at 271)."

It was further held in Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 159 P.2d 877 (1945):
"Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction to
grant additional awards even though payment has
been made to an injured employee under an agreement for final settlement, with the approval of the
commission, if after the settlement there is a change
in the condition of the employee."

Nielson did receive an order from the Industrial
Commission authorizing his lump sum payment (R22). Therefore, the court erred when it held that the
lump sum settlement exhausted Nielson's compensation.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED WHEN I'T HELD THAT NIELSON HAD SELECTED IN HIS APPLICATION THE
DATE OF INJURY AND 'THE DATE OF DISABILITY
AS THE SAME.

The date of the original injury, September 16,
1952, and the date of the greater disability, April 11,
1965, were both clearlv alleged on Nielson's application for additional compensation (R-25). In basing
its decision that Nielson, "in his own application
set both the date of injury and disability at the same
time, so that really there is no problem as to dates
of accident, disability, or discovery," the court misread the record and worked an unconscienable injustice to the applicant cmd to the cause of the statute
by its oversimplification of an insignificant point at
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we respectfully urge the
court to grant this petition for rehearing and, after
oral argument and due consideration, affirm the
decision of the Industrial Commission.
Respectfully submitted,

A. W. SANDACK

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

Attorney for Defendant

UTAH STATE AFL-CIO

Nielson and Industrial

606 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Commission of Utah
236 State Capitol

